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Abstract: Almost every legal system accepts the fundamental principle that promises must be
kept (‘pacta sunt servanda’). Yet, a consumer’s right to withdraw from a contract for the
purchase of goods or services (‘withdrawal right’) figures prominently in European consumer
law directives, in the ACQP and in the DCFR. Withdrawal rights imply a significant weak-
ening of the fundamental principle pacta sunt servanda. However, the popular invocation of
withdrawal rights is not rooted in a thorough analysis of the purposes such rights might fulfill.
This article attempts to provide such an analysis by posing the central normative question:
‘Why Withdrawal Rights?’. It uses the tools of (behavioral) economics to identify three situa-
tional categories in which granting a withdrawal right may be justified: information asym-
metries at the time of contract formation, exogenous distortions of the consumer’s preferences
and endogenous distortions. The article also seeks to assess the effectiveness of withdrawal
rights in achieving their stated objectives. It contains specific policy recommendations with
respect to the mode in which withdrawal rights should be granted, if they are granted at all
(i.e. mandatory versus optional, etc.).
Résumé: La force obligatoire du contrat figure parmi les principes fondamentaux de presque
tous les ordres juridiques. Pourtant, les droits de rétractation sont un des instruments essentiels
des directives européennes concernant la protection des consommateurs, et ils ont aussi un rôle
important dans les Principes acquis (ACQP) ainsi que dans le projet de Cadre commun de
référence (PCCR). De tels droits impliquent une atteinte signifiante du principe fondamental
‘pacta sunt servanda’. La popularité des droits de rétractation ne se fonde pas sur une analyse à
fond des objectifs que de tels droits pourraient poursuivre. Cet article entreprend de présenter
une telle analyse en posant la question normative fondamentale: ‘Pourquoi des droits de
rétractation?’. En appliquant des conceptions de l’économie comportementale, trois situations
sont identifiées dans lesquelles un droit de rétractation pourrait être justifié: Une asymétrie
d’information lors de la conclusion d’un contrat, des perturbations des préférences exogènes
du consommateur et des perturbations des préférences endogènes. L’article vise aussi à appré-
cier l’efficacité des droits de rétractation quant à l’accomplissement de leurs buts. Il contient
des propositions spécifiques concernant le mode dans lequel un droit de rétractation, s’il y a
lieu, devrait être accordé (par droit impératif, en forme d’option etc.).
Kurzfassung: In nahezu allen Rechtsordnungen gehört es zu den grundlegenden Prinzipien,
dass Verträge eingehalten werden müssen. Gleichzeitig sind Widerrufsrechte für Verbraucher
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ein wesentliches Instrument der europäischen Verbraucherschutzrichtlinien, und sie spielen
auch in den ACQP und im DCFR eine wichtige Rolle. Solche Rechte implizieren eine
signifikante Schwächung des fundamentalen Prinzips ‘pacta sunt servanda’. Die Popularität
von Widerrufsrechten beruht nicht auf einer gründlichen Analyse der Zwecke, die solche
Rechte möglicherweise erfüllen können. Der Aufsatz unternimmt es, eine solche Analyse
vorzulegen, indem er die zentrale normative Frage stellt: ‘Warum Widerrufsrechte?’ Unter
Anwendung (verhaltens-)ökonomischer Konzepte werden drei Konstellationen identifiziert,
in denen die Einräumung eines Widerrufsrechts gerechtfertigt sein könnte: Informationsa-
symmetrien bei Vertragsschluss, exogene Präferenzstörungen des Verbrauchers und endogene
Präferenzstörungen. Der Artikel versucht auch, die Effektivität von Widerrufsrechten im
Hinblick auf die Erreichung ihrer Zwecke zu beurteilen. Er enthält spezifische Vorschläge
hinsichtlich der Art der Einräumung von Widerrufsrechten (durch zwingendes Recht, als
Option etc.), sofern diese überhaupt eingeräumt werden sollten.
Pacta sunt servanda is a principle which is fundamental to a liberal system of
private law. In short, contract law dictates that each person is bound by the
contracts into which he or she has voluntarily entered. This principle is also
fundamental with respect to the efficiency of a legal system. If it did not exist,
long-term agreements could not be easily reached for fear that enforcement
would be impractical. Contract law would be more or less confined to agree-
ments governing on-the-spot contracts, with performance taking place imme-
diately upon formation. Long-term exchanges would need to be self-enforc-
ing, for example due to bilateral or multilateral security rights, or supported by
other extralegal mechanisms. For a highly developed exchange economy, this
would clearly be a step backwards.
Notwithstanding the historically proven importance of pacta sunt servanda,
the principle has slowly been eroded in Europe1 over recent decades due to the
proliferation of withdrawal rights. Such rights are an important element of the
European consumer law acquis and its further development. They grant con-
sumers an option to withdraw from a contract within a specified time period.
The option is conditioned on specific factual situations surrounding the con-
tract formation or granted with respect to specific contract types. Provided the
option exists, it may be exercised at the consumer’s discretion. In other words,
in certain situations, the consumer is entitled to withdraw from a contract for
whatever reason he or she likes or without any reason at all.
This article aims at assessing the normative foundations of withdrawal rights
as an instrument of consumer protection. The central question addressed is:
1 For the US see C. Camerer, S. Issacharoff, G. Loewenstein, T. O’Donoghue and M. Rabin,
‘Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric
Paternalism”’ (2003) 151 U Pa L Rev 1211, 1240–1242; D.J. Morgan, ‘The Right to
Rescission, Still Controversial After All These Years’ (1995) 49 Fin L Q Rep 177.
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When do withdrawal rights make sense, and why? The article takes a critical
stance towards the proliferation of withdrawal rights in the European con-
sumer law acquis. It argues that a withdrawal right should only be granted if,
in a particular case setting, its benefits clearly outweigh its costs. On this basis,
withdrawal rights are justified in far fewer circumstances than the European
consumer law acquis leads us to believe.
After a brief description of the European legal status quo (I), I will lay out the
conceptual foundations that will guide the normative analysis in the following
sections (II). The central part of this article is devoted to identifying three
different factual situations which may justify granting a withdrawal right:
information asymmetries, exogenously distorted preferences of the consumer
and endogenously distorted preferences (III). These economic categories
roughly correspond to the distance selling context, doorstep transactions,
and timesharing/credit/life insurance contracts, respectively. I will further
develop some ideas as to how the effectiveness of withdrawal rights could
be enhanced (IV), and I will attempt to answer the question of whether with-
drawal rights should also be granted to businesses (V). The main findings will
be summed up in the conclusion of this article (VI).
I Legal status quo
The legal status quo with respect to European withdrawal rights is character-
ized by a set of directives that grant such rights to consumers. These are the
following directives: (1) Directive 85/577/EEC to protect the consumer in
respect of contracts negotiated away from business premises; (2) Directive
2008/122/EC on the protection of consumers in respect of certain aspects of
timeshare, long-term holiday product, resale and exchange contracts; (3) Di-
rective 97/7/EC on the protection of consumers in respect of distance con-
tracts; (4) Directive 2002/65/EC concerning the distance marketing of con-
sumer financial services; (5) Directive 2008/48/EC on credit agreements for
consumers; (6) Directive 2002/83/EC on life insurance. The first directive
mainly concerns what has come to be known as doorstep selling transactions,
and the second refers to timeshare contracts. The third and the fourth directive
relate to distance selling, and the fifth to credit contracts. The sixth directive
stipulates a cancellation right for all policy holders under a life insurance
contract, including consumers.
Of note, however, withdrawal rights do not only figure prominently in the
existing European consumer law directives. They are also an important ele-
ment of the Acquis Principles (ACQP)2, and as such they have made their
2 Art 5:201 and 5:202 ACQP.
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inroad into the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR)3. No withdrawal
rights are to be found in the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL).
Work on the PECL began before the European consumer rights directives
were passed. Withdrawal rights do not exist in the UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts either, as these principles do not concern
consumer contracts.
The acuteness of the normative question central to this article becomes ob-
vious once one looks for justifications of withdrawal rights in the above-
mentioned consumer law directives. Recital 23 of Directive 2002/65/EC con-
cerning the distance marketing of consumer financial services, for example,
makes the following claim: ‘With a view to optimum protection of the con-
sumer, it is important that the consumer [. . .] has a right of withdrawal.’ This
statement begs the question – Why? – yet does not answer it4. This is even
more problematic as the withdrawal right granted by Directive 2002/65/EC is
also stipulated, without further reflection, for all credit agreements (see recital
34 of Directive 2008/48/EC).
In the two cases mentioned, withdrawal rights have been granted by the Euro-
pean legislature without any justification being proffered. More recently, new
withdrawal rights have been proposed on a basis which is very dubious at least.
Recital 14 of the proposal for a directive on consumer rights5, for example,
seeks to justify the sweeping proposal of granting a withdrawal right with
respect to all contracts concluded off-premises: ‘In an off-premises context,
consumers are under psychological pressure no matter whether they have
solicited the trader’s visit or not’. The assumption underlying this sentence
is controversial and, at least in its generality, untenable. Further, no critical
reflection on this important point is to be found in the Commission’s proposal,
nor in recital 14 or anywhere else in the text. Similar to the proposal for a
directive on consumer rights, the ACQP and the DCFR also suggest that
consumers should have a withdrawal right with respect to all off-premises
contracts (Articles 5:201 ACQP, I.-5:201 DCFR). Again, no justification is
offered for why this should be so. In short, withdrawal rights are endorsed as
an instrument of consumer protection without proper reflection.
Hence, it is clear that offering a coherent and compelling justification for
withdrawal rights is an important academic and policy task. As withdrawal
rights entail a significant erosion of the pacta sunt servanda principle, advocat-
3 Art II.-5:201 and II.-5:202 DCFR.
4 For a similar claim see Recital 45 of Directive 2002/83/EC concerning life insurance: ‘For
life assurance contracts the policy holder should be given the opportunity of cancelling the
contract within a period of between 14 and 30 days.’
5 COM(2008) 614 final.
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ing them without an understanding of when and how they make sense is
inadvisable.
II Conceptual foundations
Withdrawal rights grant an option to withdraw: the consumer entitled to the
right may withdraw from an agreement, but he or she is not forced to with-
draw nor commit to the execution of the agreement. The optional character of
withdrawal rights corresponds to the potential impairment of the consumer’s
will formation, in the sense of his or her intention to be bound, as the basis of
the withdrawal right. Something might have been wrong with this will for-
mation process, but we do not know for sure. However, the consumer can
exercise the withdrawal right under any circumstance, regardless of whether
he or she originally intended to be bound by the contract and fully understood
the terms of the agreement. In other words, withdrawal rights allow a con-
sumer to avoid contractual obligations simply because he or she changed their
mind, or, for example, because more attractive offers became available.
Justifying withdrawal rights crucially depends on the specific measuring rod
used. There are good reasons to assert that private law rules should primarily
be designed on the basis of their efficiency effects. Such rules are ill-suited to
achieve redistributive goals6. Hence, I will assess the merits of withdrawal
rights based on whether and under which circumstances they enhance eco-
nomic efficiency. From an economic standpoint, the fundamental principle is
easily stated: withdrawal rights should be granted only if their benefits out-
weigh their costs. This is clearly a very abstract formula7. Therefore, it is
central to the understanding of these rights that we attempt to categorize
the types of costs and benefits which are presumptively associated with with-
drawal from a contract in particular factual settings.
Turning to the costs first, these come in various forms: exercising withdrawal
rights involves transaction costs; there is legal uncertainty during the exercise
6 Contrast H. Eidenmüller, F. Faust, H.C. Grigoleit, N. Jansen, G. Wagner and
R. Zimmermann, ‘The Common Frame of Reference for European Private Law – Policy
Choices and Codification Problems’ (2008) 28 OJLS 659, 672, with M.W. Hesselink, CFR
& Social Justice (München: Sellier, 2008).
7 The advantage of such an abstract formula is that it leaves room to identify different fact
patterns and associated normative rationales based on which stipulating withdrawal rights
might be justified. As to this, see the following sections of this article. Contrast this
approach with the model constructed by O. Ben-Shahar and E.A. Posner, ‘The Right
To Withdraw in Contract Law’, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1569753 (March 14, 2010), 5
et seq. By focusing on only one relevant aspect – uncertainty of the buyer about how much
he or she values a good – the authors lose sight of many fact patterns and normative
rationales for granting a withdrawal right.
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period, and there are costs associated with delayed or abandoned consump-
tion8. It is important to note that in a competitive market, all the costs just
mentioned are ultimately borne by all consumers. They bear the costs trig-
gered by those consumers who can be characterized as ‘withdrawal rights
users’. To put it differently, withdrawal rights are paid for by all consumers,
regardless of whether they wish to have and/or to exercise such rights9.
Whereas the costs associated with (the exercise of) withdrawal rights come in
different forms, the principal benefit is only one, and it can be stated as fol-
lows: withdrawal rights are a tool to counteract the performance of inefficient
contracts. A contract is inefficient if a consumer contracts goods or services,
the price – and costs in the competitive market – of which exceeds the benefit
to the consumer. A consumer might enter into such a contract due to some
form of irrationality and/or impairment of the will formation process. The
precise conditions under which this might happen will be spelled out in later
sections of this article.
In the policy debate on withdrawal rights, such rights are sometimes defended
with the argument that they strengthen consumer confidence in specific dis-
tribution channels such as distance selling10. Such a benefit, however, is very
hard to quantify. Moreover, granting withdrawal rights irrespective of their
cost-benefit effects on the micro level of specific transactions would surely be
over-inclusive: withdrawal rights would exist even though, on that level, they
are clearly not worth their costs. It is not convincing to advocate withdrawal
rights as a means to inspire consumer confidence regardless of their necessity
as a protective tool on the micro level.
The cost-benefit analysis presented thus far is complicated by the fact that
entering into and performing an inefficient contract might have an ‘educatory
function’, ie long-term efficiency benefits. To hold someone to a contract that
he or she would not have entered into upon proper reflection creates a negative
experience for this person. However, it will give the individual an opportunity
to learn, and to behave more astutely in the future. Such learning experiences
are, in principle, desirable. However, the consequences of holding someone to
an inefficient contract are sometimes so grave that the likelihood of that person
8 However, the last cost mentioned (abandoned consumption) is a relevant cost only if a
withdrawal right is exercised even though the contract was efficient in the first place (ie, if
the withdrawal right should not have been exercised). What is meant by an ‘efficient
contract’ will be explained immediately in the text.
9 See G. Borges and B. Irlenbusch, ‘Fairness Crowded out by Law: An Experimental Study
on Withdrawal Rights’ (2007) 163 JITE 84, 87 (10% of all customers are ‘responsible’ for
40% of all withdrawals).
10 See ‘Commission presents results of Eurobarometer on consumer protection in the
Internal Market’, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/
1268&format=HTML&aged=0&language=DE&guiLanguage=en.
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engaging in a similar transaction in the future becomes very slight. Think, for
example, of the grave financial consequences stemming from a particular
transaction where the future actions of the consumer are significantly limited
by the agreement. As a consequence of the foregoing analysis, the following
general principle can be stated: granting a withdrawal right in a particular case
setting is only justified if the benefits of such a right clearly outweigh the
associated costs. The case for a withdrawal right is strongest if the consequen-
ces of not being able to withdraw from an inefficient contract are grave for the
consumer.
Finally, the question arises as to whether contract practice is a good indicator
for the efficiency of withdrawal rights. As is well-known, the Coase theorem
holds that efficient arrangements will tend to emerge provided that market
transactions are possible and transaction costs are not prohibitively high11.
However, it is clear that the conditions under which the Coase theorem oper-
ates do not necessarily hold in the context in which withdrawal rights might be
justified. This is so because reasons which may justify granting a withdrawal
right in a particular case setting might be exactly those that affect the efficiency
of the consumer’s contract decision and, as a consequence, the efficiency of
contractual practice in that particular case setting.
As an intermediate conclusion it can be stated that withdrawal rights should be
granted only if their benefits clearly exceed their costs in a specific setting.
Contract practice is not a reliable indicator to determine whether these con-
ditions hold.
III Justifying withdrawal rights
In the following sections, three different rationales will be discussed which
may justify granting withdrawal rights in particular case settings: information
asymmetries, exogenously distorted preferences of the consumer, and endo-
genously distorted preferences. These three rationales correspond to three
transaction types that are currently governed by different directives of the
European withdrawal rights regime: distance selling, doorstep transactions,
and timesharing/credit/life insurance contracts.
1 Information asymmetries
In economic theory, a distinction is made between search goods, experience
goods and credence goods12. Search goods are goods whose quality can be
11 R. Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 J Law & Econ 1.
12 Cf Ph. Nelson, ‘Information and Consumer Behavior’ (1970) 78 J Pol Econ 311;
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ascertained upon inspection. An example would be unpacked fruits in a shop.
There is clearly no need for granting a withdrawal right to consumers with
respect to the purchase of search goods. The consumer is immediately able to
identify whether the good in question suits his or her interests upon inspection
in the shop.
Credence goods are goods whose characteristics can be observed by the con-
sumer neither prior to the transaction nor after purchase or consumption. An
example of a credence good are the services provided by a medical professional
or a lawyer. A non-professional will have difficulty in ascertaining the quality
of the services, and such difficulty will exist both before and after the trans-
action. Hence, withdrawal rights do not make much sense with respect to
credence goods, as a consumer would not normally be able to make sensible
use of such a right. As the consumer is not in the position to determine
whether the contract is efficient in the first place, the withdrawal right period
will elapse without a considerate exercise of the right being possible.
Experience goods are goods whose product characteristics are only ascertain-
able upon inspection and consumption. An example would be dinner in a
restaurant. Whether a particular good is an experience good can depend on
the distribution channel by which the good is marketed and the way in which
it is presented in a store. Distance selling, for example, can ‘create’ experience
goods that would be search goods if sold in a shop.
As is well-known, information asymmetries with respect to experience goods
can lead to market failure because of adverse selection13. Buyers who are
uncertain about the quality of the good purchased will assume a medium
quality standard. High quality vendors will not be able to charge high prices
for their goods, as buyers will not be willing to honor such high quality since
they are incapable of recognizing it. Hence, the average quality of the goods
offered deteriorates, and the market for a particular good may even break
down14.
This dynamic is an important one especially in the distance selling context. A
consumer that sees a particular product, for example a piece of clothing, of-
fered on a website, will often be unsure whether the product is really suitable
or will fit. Hence, the consumer is uncertain whether the good in question will
provide a benefit that is worth the associated costs. As a consequence, the
M. Darby and E. Karni, ‘Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud’ (1973) 16
J Law & Econ 67.
13 G. Akerlof, ‘The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mech-
anism’ (1970) 84 Q J Econ 488.
14 This is not discussed by M.B.M. Loos, ‘Rights of Withdrawal’, http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=1350224 (February 27, 2009), 7 et seq, in his critique of withdrawal rights in the
distance selling context.
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consumer might adjust his or her willingness to pay accordingly, ie offer only a
price reflecting the probability that upon receipt of the good it turns out that
its anticipated value is not reached. Hence, the total sales volume might be
lower than it would be in the absence of such information asymmetries.
Vendors can give various signals about the quality of their offerings, thereby
reducing information asymmetries and preventing market failure. Such signals
will be most effective in achieving this end if it is less costly for high quality
sellers to send them as compared to low quality sellers. For example, a signal of
that kind may be found in the form of a guarantee. A high quality vendor can
signal high quality products at low costs by issuing a guarantee. Given the high
quality of the product, the associated guarantee costs are comparatively low.
Along those lines, withdrawal rights can also be explained as a signal. Vendors
who anticipate that consumers will only make use of such rights on rare
occasions, because the products purchased have a high value, can offer with-
drawal rights cheaply.
If it is true that withdrawal rights can work as a voluntary device used by
vendors in the distance selling context to overcome information asymmetries,
the next important question is this: why should withdrawal rights be granted
by mandatory law, i.e. why should businesses be forced by law to offer con-
sumers contracts that provide withdrawal rights? In the following sections, I
endeavour to answer this question by discussing three different policy options
with respect to a withdrawal rights regime in the distance selling context. A
first subsection will deal with withdrawal rights as a mandatory rule, which
reflects the status quo according to Directive 97/7/EC on the protection of
consumers in respect of distance contracts, and Directive 2002/65/EC con-
cerning the distance marketing of consumer financial services. In the following
subsections I will then discuss withdrawal rights as merely a default rule, and
finally withdrawal rights as a regime to be chosen – as an option – by the
consumer.
a) Withdrawal right as a mandatory rule (status quo)
Under the European legal status quo just described, consumers have a man-
datory entitlement to a withdrawal right with respect to distance selling con-
tracts. A consumer cannot waive this entitlement even though he or she may
wish to contract without a withdrawal right at a possibly lower price. The
parties are stuck with the regime as prescribed by the law. Given that this
withdrawal rights regime involves a significant erosion of the pacta sunt ser-
vanda principle, only compelling reasons could justify this legal status quo.
Such compelling reasons do not exist. Withdrawal rights may be agreed to
voluntarily between contracting parties, even where no such entitlements exist
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as a matter of statutory law. Large retailers in particular offer the right to
withdraw from the agreement with respect to on-premises purchases, and
there are also cases in which withdrawal rights are offered vis-a-vis businesses
as customers15. Obviously, the signalling mechanism described in the previous
section works to overcome information asymmetries on a voluntary basis. It is
true that it has also been argued in a previous section of this article that
contract practice is not a reliable indicator with respect to the efficiency of
withdrawal rights. However, contract practice is such an indicator with respect
to distance selling and the overcoming of information asymmetries. Here, the
consumer’s contract decision is not twisted due to some exogenously or en-
dogenously induced irrationality16. Rather, the problem of market failure due
to information asymmetries arises even if, or precisely because, all market
participants behave in a completely rational manner.
Voluntarily providing a withdrawal right as a signal in the distance selling
context would be easy. As with respect to payment or delivery details or other
similar contractual issues, the consumer could simply be offered the option to
‘check the box’ if he or she wished to conclude a contract with a right to
withdraw. The added transaction costs of such a regime would be negligible.
All in all, no compelling case can be made for granting a withdrawal right as a
mandatory rule in the distance selling context. Hence, the current legal status
quo is unsatisfactory and should be changed.
b) Withdrawal right as a default rule
If it is true that there are no compelling reasons to force a permissive, non-
waivable withdrawal right on the consumer in the distance selling context,
such a right might at least be provided as a default rule. Under such a regime,
the statutory withdrawal right of the consumer could be contracted away by
the parties. To justify this rule, one could point to the fact that it might reflect
15 For examples see H. Eidenmüller, ‘Party Autonomy, Distributive Justice and the Con-
clusion of Contracts in the DCFR’ (2009) 5 ERCL 109, 126 n 32. See also Ben-Shahar and
Posner, n 7 above, 4 et seq.
16 It is true that vendors sometimes do apply manipulative tactics also with respect to
distance selling transactions. For example, they might seek to trick consumers into
contracts by taking advantage of surprise effects, etc. However, this is a rather rare
problem created by a minority of dishonest or even criminal merchants. Moreover, other
private law rules such as those on the conclusion of contracts (Was there really accept-
ance?), mistake, misrepresentation, etc., should offer sufficient protection to the con-
sumer. Finally, it is far easier for a consumer to withstand such tactics when having the
opportunity to reflect calmly on the sensibility of a particular contract when sitting
behind his or her computer at home than when confronted with aggressive sales tactics
in a shop or on the street.
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the typical interests of the parties and thus economizes on transaction costs.
This, of course, is the rationale typically put forward to justify a default rule.
However, this economizing effect might exist only for certain transactions. In
other words, it is unclear whether each and every consumer in every distance
selling transaction actually desires to have a withdrawal right. The consumer
in question is best positioned to assess whether a withdrawal right is worth its
associated costs. However, under a default rule regime the consumer cannot
make this decision unilaterally. The most likely result is that businesses would
deviate from the withdrawal right in their standard terms – perhaps not all
businesses, but at least a significant portion. Then the courts would need to
review the efficiency of the withdrawal right if such terms were challenged. As
the courts do not have a clear picture regarding the costs and benefits related to
the right of withdrawal with respect to different consumers, they are not in a
good position to make this decision.
Hence, it must be concluded that no compelling case can be made for a with-
drawal right as a default rule in the distance selling context. The main criticism
that must be levelled against this regime is that it fails to allocate the decision
competence with respect to the desirability of a withdrawal right to the most
appropriate party, namely the consumer17.
c) Withdrawal right as an optional regime
This deficiency of stipulating a withdrawal right in the distance selling context
as a default rule might be remedied by a regime under which the withdrawal
right would be a statutory option for the consumer. Under this regime, the
consumer must be offered a choice between a contract with and without a
right to withdraw. This option would force the consumer to decide whether
such a right would be worth the higher price for the withdrawal opportunity.
In essence, this regime would conceive a withdrawal right in the distance
selling context as an insurance of the consumer against the risk of finding
out after the delivery that the product or service contracted is not worth the
price paid. The additional price for having the withdrawal option is the ‘in-
surance premium’ that must be borne by the consumer.
A clear advantage of this regime is that only those consumers who benefit from
such rights would contract and pay for the option to withdraw18. Hence, some
form of separating equilibrium would emerge in which two types of contracts
17 Ben-Shahar and Posner, n 7 above, 20, who advocate withdrawal rights as a default
regime, fail to see this.
18 To be more precise, a consumer purchasing the withdrawal option will have to bear the
expected costs associated with the withdrawal right, ie the costs discounted by the
probability of withdrawal.
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in the distance selling context would exist: contracts with withdrawal rights
for a slightly higher price and contracts without withdrawal rights for a
slightly lower price. The price differential will, in a competitive market, reflect
the marginal costs of the businesses and thus be small19. Therefore, consumers
will not be able to act opportunistically by buying goods with a withdrawal
right, returning them after having exercised the right, and then buy them again
much cheaper without a withdrawal right. As long as there is no significant
price differential between the two types of contracts, such opportunistic ac-
tion would be limited to rare cases. Further, under these circumstances, ven-
dors would not be able to act strategically by charging exorbitantly high prices
for contracts containing the right to withdraw. Competitive forces will drive
the price of the ‘insurance premium’ down to the marginal costs of the ven-
dors.
With respect to the specific form in which the consumer must exercise his or
her choice, both an opt-out and an opt-in solution are conceivable. Under the
former, the consumer would have a withdrawal right unless he or she chose –
by ‘checking the box’ – not to have it. Under the latter regime, the consumer
would have the ability to opt-in to the withdrawal rights regime by ‘checking
the box’. It is difficult to foresee what the choice frequency under these two
regimes exactly would be. Endowment effects might make the withdrawal
right sticky under an opt-out regime20. However, framing effects might work
in a different direction. If the consumer chose not to have a withdrawal right
by opting out, this could be presented as a contract with a discount price21. The
overall direction of the effects is unclear. A third and neutral mode of the
optional regime would be to ask the consumer to check either of two boxes,
i.e. a contract with a withdrawal right and a contract without.
A potential argument against the proposed regime could be that consumers
might systematically underestimate the risk of entering into inefficient con-
tracts and hence might not purchase the withdrawal option even if this were
useful in a particular case. It is true that there is empirical evidence that in-
19 See, for example, http://www.bonprixservice.de/bp/bestellung/belohnt.html (offering a
discount of EUR 3 for the next purchase if withdrawal right with respect to the previous
transaction is not exercised).
20 On such effects see, for example, R. Thaler, ‘Towards a Positive Theory of Consumer
Choice’ (1980) 1 J Econ Behav & Org 39, 44; D. Kahneman, J.L. Knetsch and
R.H. Thaler, ‘Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem’
(1990) 98 J Pol Econ 1325, 1342; D. Kahneman, J.L. Knetsch and R.H. Thaler, ‘Anoma-
lies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias’ (1991) 5 J Econ Persp
193, 194 et seq; H. Eidenmüller, Effizienz als Rechtsprinzip: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen
der ökonomischen Analyse des Rechts (3rd ed, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005) 125 et seq.
21 See Ch. Bühring-Uhle, H. Eidenmüller and A. Nelle, Verhandlungsmanagement: Ana-
lyse, Werkzeuge, Strategien (München: C H Beck, 2009) 39 et seq.
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dividuals are overly optimistic22. More specifically, however, the evidence
suggests that individuals consistently overestimate objectively small probabil-
ities and underestimate large ones23. As concluding an inefficient contract is
rather unlikely objectively, this effect seems to suggest that too many with-
drawal options would be purchased. Moreover, distance selling transactions
usually involve low value consumer goods, and consumers usually engage in
such transactions repeatedly. There seem to be sufficient possibilities for learn-
ing to occur should a particular consumer discover that he or she makes mis-
takes in the sense of purchasing without a withdrawal right even though hav-
ing such a right would have been useful with respect to a certain transaction.
Hence, consumers should be willing to opt for the withdrawal regime in
sufficient quantity.
The crucial question again is why the aforementioned regime, ie an optional
withdrawal right, should be mandatory in the sense that the law would stip-
ulate that consumers must be given the choice described. There are a couple of
reasons for this. First, there is the economic interest in contract standardiza-
tion. Having a uniform optional withdrawal rights regime would likely serve
to lower transaction costs. Second, legal certainty and transparency would be
fostered by such a uniform regime. Third, even though the regime would be
mandatory, consumers would gain more freedom relative to the legal status
quo by having an option that they do not now have. Finally, vendors would
not have a good reason to complain, as they would be compensated for grant-
ing a withdrawal right if the consumer so elected, by being able to charge a
slightly higher price. Hence, vendors would not be worse off compared to the
status quo.
The option model just described should apply to distance selling of experience
goods. However, a case may be made to apply it to distance selling in general,
that is to say also with respect to credence goods. In a previous section it was
argued that credence goods information asymmetries do not disappear after
the conclusion of the contract and therefore withdrawal rights are only of
limited use as a consumer protection device. However, with respect to distance
selling there are less opportunities to clarify problems and give advice by
vendor personnel as compared to on-premises negotiations. Moreover, the
option model developed does not force consumers into a withdrawal rights
regime. Further, it is fair to vendors as they are able to charge a slightly higher
price for a contract with a withdrawal right. Finally, as previously noted, there
is an economic interest in contract-standardization. Hence, requiring that
22 B. Fischhoff, P. Slovic and S. Lichtenstein, ‘Knowing with Certainty: The Appropriate-
ness of Extreme Confidence’ (1977) 3 J Exp Psych: Hum Perc & Perf 552.
23 A. Rapoport, Decision Theory and Decision Practice (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989) 116.
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vendors provide a withdrawal right option to the consumer with respect to
distance selling in general is a defensible policy choice24.
However, this option model should not be applied to on-premises contracts.
With respect to such contracts, uncertainty relates primarily to product qual-
ity and is addressed by legal rules on product quality. Moreover, uncertainties
with respect to product use and utility can be reduced by inspection and
communication with vendor personnel. The option model developed in this
section should therefore not be extended to on-premises contracts.
As an intermediate conclusion it can be stated that in the distance selling
context, information asymmetries with respect to product use and utility
can lead to market failure. Granting consumers a withdrawal right can be a
device to counteract these asymmetries and the resulting potential market
failure. Consumers should be given an option to choose between a contract
with and a contract without a withdrawal right.
2 Exogenously distorted preferences
Inefficient contracts exist where information asymmetries prevent the con-
sumers from correctly appreciating the utility of a particular product or ser-
vice. However, such contracts may also result from distortions of the consum-
ers’ preferences stemming from exogenous sources. Consumers’ contract
decisions can be distorted by various external influences. Surprise, time pres-
sure, psychological entrapment, the inability to easily terminate contract ne-
gotiations, and other manipulative tactics might all contribute to a particular
contract decision being based on the distorted preferences of a consumer25.
As a consequence, the contract decision of the consumer itself might be in-
efficient: the consumer purchases goods or orders services for which he or she
has no use or for which the use-related value is at least lower than the price
which, in a competitive market, reflects the costs of the seller. If the distortion
of the consumer’s preferences normally corrects itself in a cooling-off period,
granting a withdrawal right can be a sensible policy choice.
A good example for this is the withdrawal right under Directive 85/577/EEC
for contracts concluded during an excursion or on occasion of a visit to the
consumer’s home26. With respect to the latter (also known as doorstep sales), it
24 However, as will be shown later in the text, in the case of timesharing and credit con-
tracts, endogenous preference distortions of the consumers might justify even more rigid
protection in the sense of an unconditional withdrawal right.
25 For an overview with respect to ‘rationality traps’ in negotiations see Bühring-Uhle,
Eidenmüller and Nelle, n 21 above, 38 et seq.
26 Identifying specific factual situations in which a withdrawal right is granted will both be
over- and underinclusive in the sense that not everybody who finds himself or herself in
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is the irritation caused by the vendor that is most relevant for justifying the
withdrawal right; the decisive factor with respect to excursions is the inability
to leave the scene easily other than by entering into a contract. The withdrawal
right must be available under these circumstances as the preference distortion
of the consumer would also affect his or her decision for or against a with-
drawal right27. In other words, it is clear that with respect to the type of
distortions that occur in the doorstep selling context, contract practice is
not a reliable indicator for the efficiency of a withdrawal right.
Much less convincing than granting a withdrawal right in the doorstep selling
context is the recent development in the ACQP, the DCFR, and the draft
consumer rights directive towards a withdrawal right for all off-premises
contracts. The only reason put forward to justify this sweeping extension of
the legal status quo is the surprise effect that is allegedly present with respect to
off-premises contracts28. It is argued that the consumer does not anticipate
engaging in a business transaction off-premises and hence is caught off guard
when faced with contractual negotiations under such circumstances. This is a
relevant consideration, though not a strong one. This is already made clear by
the long list of exemptions that we find in the ACQP, the DCFR, and the draft
consumer rights directive as related to the general principle of granting a
withdrawal right with respect to all off-premises contracts29. Moreover, ma-
nipulative tactics and tricks are applied even more forcefully regarding con-
tracts concluded on-premises. This is the vendor’s natural environment, and
we can all certainly recall the last time when we bought something in a shop
solely in an effort to free ourselves from the persistent and unnerving ap-
proaches and tactics of the vendor. Compared to off-premises negotiations
it is also more difficult to terminate negotiations in the vendor’s shop30. In
such a situation needs protection, whereas others who find themselves in another (but
similar) situation would need protection. However, this is the necessary consequence of
typing. On this see S. Lorenz, Der Schutz vor dem unerwünschten Vertrag (München: C
H Beck, 1997) 166 et seq.
27 This rationale for the mandatory nature of the withdrawal right has nothing to do with
asymmetric information, however, as Ben-Shahar and Posner, n 7 above, 20, believe.
28 See P. Møgelvang-Hansen, E. Terryn and R. Schulze, in Research Group on Existing EC
Private Law (Acquis Group), Principles of the Existing EC Contract Law (Acquis Prin-
ciples) – Contract I: Pre-contractual Obligations, Conclusion of Contract, Unfair Terms
(München: Sellier, 2007) art 5:201 margin no 3.
29 With respect to the draft consumer rights directive see art 12 for the general principle
(right of withdrawal) and art 19(2), 20(1) and 20(2) for the exceptions.
30 It is noteworthy that affording protection (only) for all off-premises contracts provides
insufficient protection in certain cases in which such protection is warranted. On the
basis of the definitions in art 2(8) and 2(9) of the draft consumer rights directive, the
consumer – different from the legal status quo – does not enjoy the benefit of a with-
drawal right when he or she participates in an excursion, but concludes the contract
thereafter on the premises of the organizer or a third party. On this problem see B. Jud
ERCL 1/2011 W h y W i t h d r a w a l R i g h t s ? 1 5
Bereitgestellt von | Universitaetsbibliothek der LMU Muenchen
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 04.11.15 09:50
addition, the surprise effect can be present there as well. For example, one
might enter a bank simply to withdraw some money only to find oneself roped
into some kind of sales negotiations by the bank’s employees regarding an
unwanted financial product.
Hence, there is clearly no compelling reason to differentiate between off-
premises contracts and on-premises contracts with respect to the potential
exogenous distortions that influence the consumer’s choice. These two types
of transactions should be treated alike. However, stipulating a general with-
drawal right for all contracts, wherever they are concluded, is not warranted.
It would only be justified if the assumption were correct that a great majority
of contracts are one-sided, in the sense that the consumers purchased goods or
services for which they fail to derive a use that exceeds the price they paid. This
assumption has no plausible basis. Granting a right to withdraw for all con-
tracts, wherever they are concluded, would also be counterproductive with
respect to long-term efficiency. Every contract would insure the consumers
against the risk that something might be wrong with the contract decision in a
small number of cases. This approach would destroy all incentives for con-
sumers to reflect in advance, ie before contract formation, on whether the price
of the good or service offered exceeds its anticipated value to the consumer.
Such consequences are not in line with the image of the ‘confident consum-
er’31. Fostering erratic consumption ‘at all costs’ is not a sensible economic or
political goal.
By way of a further intermediate conclusion it can be stated that exogenously
distorted preferences of consumers justify granting a (mandatory) withdrawal
right in the doorstep selling context. However, there are no persuasive argu-
ments to stipulate such a withdrawal right for all contracts concluded off-
premises. It is not reasonable to assume that the great majority of contracts
concluded off-premises are inefficient and hence justify the stipulation of a
(mandatory) withdrawal right.
3 Endogenously distorted preferences
Individual contract decisions might not only be distorted because of exoge-
nous effects. Internal, psychological effects may also play a role. In recent
and Ch. Wendehorst, ‘Proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights – an Academic
Position Paper’ (2009) 6 GPR 68, 70; Ch. Wendehorst, ‘The CFR and the Review of
the Acquis Communautaire’, in M. Schmidt-Kessel (ed), Der gemeinsame Referenzrah-
men: Entstehung, Inhalte, Anwendung (München: Sellier, 2009) 323, 340.
31 The ‘confident consumer’ figures prominently in the ECJ’s jurisprudence. See, for exam-
ple, ECJ, Case 252/07 (Intel v CPM), Judgment of 27 November 2008, margin no 34: ‘. . .
average consumers . . . who are reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and
circumspect . . .’.
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decades, many systematic deviations from the assumption of fully rational
behaviour have been discovered by cognitive psychologists: individuals are
overly optimistic32, they work with hyperbolic discount functions33, they
falsely rely primarily on available information (‘availability bias’)34, and they
also falsely rely too much on the status quo as opposed to deviations from it
(‘status quo bias’)35. As a starting principle, one might say that a withdrawal
right is justified where grave distortions appear to typically exist but which
normally vanish in the cooling-off period.
The current legal status quo assumes that this is the case with respect to time-
sharing agreements, credit contracts, and life insurance contracts. However, it
is not readily apparent why this should be so. On its face, the complexity of the
agreements in question seems to justify a withdrawal right. Consumers have
difficulty understanding complex transactions and assessing their consequen-
ces fully and rationally. The problem is that this defect does not change during
the cooling-off period, ie we do not have good reason to believe that we are
better positioned to assess these effects after contract conclusion than prior to
it. One might even go so far as to make the claim that the prospect of contract
formation should sharpen our intellectual capabilities: ‘Depend upon it, Sir,
when a man knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates his mind
wonderfully.’36
Apart from the complexity of timesharing agreements, credit contracts, and
life insurance contracts, the long-term effects of these agreements might be a
factor that could justify granting a withdrawal right. However, such effects
also exist with respect to other types of contracts, for example long-term
leases, for which no withdrawal right is stipulated by law. Further, long-term
effects are likely better addressed by legal rules on mandatory consultation
before contract formation and rules on contract termination. Hence, long-
term effects do not seem to be a compelling argument to justify withdrawal
rights for these types of contracts.
Finally, timesharing agreements, credit contracts and life insurance contracts
often involve grave financial consequences for consumers. Moreover, apart
from potential endogenous preference distortions, exogenous distortions are
quite often simultaneously present as well, ie the consumer acts under the
manipulative influence of vendor personnel37. Stipulating a withdrawal right
32 See n 22 above.
33 D.I. Laibson, ‘Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting’ (1997) 112 Q J Econ 443.
34 A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, ‘Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and
Probability’ (1973) 5 Cogn Psychol 207.
35 W. Samuelson and R.J. Zeckhauser, ‘Status Quo Bias in Decision Making’ (1988) 1 J Risk
& Uncert 7.
36 J. Boswell, The Life of Samuel Johnson (London, 1823 [1791], vol III) 171.
37 See also P. Mankowski, Beseitigungsrechte (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003) 241 et seq.
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that must be exercised within a cooling-off period would give the consumer
time to reflect, and seek counsel from peers or advisors. Taken together, all the
above-mentioned factors likely make up a sufficiently good case for stipulat-
ing a right of withdrawal with respect to timesharing agreements, credit con-
tracts, and life insurance contracts.
These factors are not necessarily present with respect to the distance selling of
financial products. For example, if such products are bought over the internet,
the vendor cannot apply the same manipulative tactics as are very often used in
direct conversations which take place on the vendor’s premises. However, if no
withdrawal right exists once a credit contract or other financial products are
marketed via distance selling, competitive distortions with respect to different
distribution channels for financial products would arise. Hence, stipulating a
withdrawal right for timesharing agreements, credit contracts, and life insur-
ance contracts is a defensible policy choice, regardless of the distribution
channel used for the sale of these products.
As with withdrawal rights in general, consideration should be given as to why
the proposed regime should be mandatory. Granting consumers a withdrawal
right with respect to timesharing agreements, credit contracts, and life insur-
ance contracts only as an optional regime might enhance their awareness for
problems related to their own choice. It might even increase the usage of the
right in those cases where the consumers actually opt for it. On the other hand,
the potential irrationality related to the decision to contract might also influ-
ence the decision for or against a withdrawal right. Moreover, there is the
potential simultaneous presence of exogenous preference distortions originat-
ing from the vendors’ personnel. Hence, the regime should actually be man-
datory for all timesharing agreements, credit contracts, and life insurance
contracts38.
As a further intermediate conclusion it can be stated that endogenously dis-
torted preferences support granting a mandatory withdrawal right with re-
spect to timesharing agreements, credit contracts, and life insurance contracts.
In sum, the complexity of the agreements in question, their long-term effects
and in particular the very often grave financial consequences for the consum-
ers, and the simultaneous presence of exogenous preference distortions justify
the proposed regime.
IV Enhancing the effectiveness of withdrawal rights
It is one thing to consider whether, under certain circumstances, withdrawal
rights may be used as a sensible tool to counteract the performance of ineffi-
38 This is not appreciated by Ben-Shahar and Posner, n 7 above, 20.
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cient contracts. Another question is whether, under the assumption that such
circumstances can be identified, withdrawal rights are effective in achieving
their purpose. There are various reasons to be concerned that the effectiveness
of withdrawal rights under the current European legal status quo is not as high
as it could be. First, it should be acknowledged that withdrawal rights are
exercised at a relatively low rate. Independent empirical studies have found
that the rate of exercising the right ranges between 2 percent and 5 percent in
doorstep selling transactions, and between 15 percent and 35 percent in dis-
tance selling transactions39. In explaining these figures and their differences,
one might hypothesize that in doorstep transactions the great majority of
contracts are apparently efficient. By contrast, in the distance selling context
a significant number of transactions apparently involve ‘try out’ purchases.
However, these rationales might not be the only ones that explain the rela-
tively low exercise rate of withdrawal rights, especially with respect to door-
step transactions. Other factors might also play a role, such as the reduction of
cognitive dissonances and endowment effects40. Both psychological phenom-
ena might lead consumers to retain a particular good just purchased even
though before the transaction the use value of the good was below the pur-
chase price, ie even though the contract is inefficient.
There are good reasons to disregard endowment effects with respect to policy
choices based on an efficiency calculus. It is as arbitrary to pick offer prices as
it is to pick asking prices in determining the value of a particular good to the
39 See Bundestag-Drucksache 10/2876 of 15 February 1985, 7 et seq (before the introduc-
tion of the statutory withdrawal right with respect to doorstep transactions, only ap-
proximately 1,8% of the voluntarily provided withdrawal rights in Germany were ac-
tually exercised); Office of Fair Trading, Doorstep selling: A report on the market study,
2004, Annex L, http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/consumer_protection/
oft716l.pdf, 49 (according to a British survey conducted in 2003, the exercise rate with
respect to withdrawal rights relating to doorstep transactions is around 6%); Borges and
Irlenbusch, n 9 above, 88 (exercise rate with respect to withdrawal rights relating to
distance selling contracts in Germany rose from 24,2% in 1998 to 35,0% in 2004);
Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskammertag (DIHK)/Trusted Shops, Auswertung
der Umfrage zur Praxis des Widerrufs im Fernabsatz bei Warenlieferungsverträgen auf
der Basis von 385 Rückantworten, http://www.trustedshops.de/shop-info/wp-content/
uploads/2010/08/umfrage_widerrufsrecht.pdf (according to a DIHK survey among 385
German retailers in 2010, the exercise rate with respect to distance selling contracts
ranges from 12,8% [gifts] to 28,5% [shoes, clothing]).
40 On cognitive dissonances see L. Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1957). On the effect of ‘dissonance reduction’ on the exercise
rate of withdrawal rights see H. Eidenmüller, ‘Der homo oeonomicus und das Schuld-
recht: Herausforderungen durch Behavioral Law and Economics’ (2005) 60 Juristen-
zeitung 216, 218, 221; J.A. Blumenthal, ‘Emotional Paternalism’ (2007) 35 Fls St U L
Rev 1, 62. On endowment effects see the references cited in n 20 above. On the relevance
of such effects on the exercise rate of withdrawal rights see Eidenmüller, op cit, 218 et seq
and 221 et seq.
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consumer41. Selective perception as a consequence of the desire to reduce
cognitive dissonances, however, is a serious problem because situations might
arise in which a plainly inefficient contract is not terminated by the consumer
even though the consumer holds a right to withdraw.
One possibility to counteract this effect would be to change the structure of
the withdrawal regime. Instead of giving the consumer an option to withdraw
from an agreement, the law could stipulate that such withdrawal would occur
automatically upon the end of the withdrawal period unless the consumer
explicitly confirms the agreement42. Under this ‘confirmation regime’, the
consumer would be required to affirm the contract if he or she wished to be
bound. This would work against the dissonance reduction and selective per-
ception problem just described, and would enhance the effectiveness of the
‘withdrawal right’ granted as well. On the other hand, such a system would
certainly raise the costs of contracting, since the majority of contracts would
actually be confirmed. Moreover, the proposed regime would also reward
opportunistic consumer behaviour: It would incentivise consumers to strate-
gically purchase goods or services for temporary use which would then be
returned upon expiration of the ‘withdrawal period’. Finally, the ‘confirma-
tion regime’ would surely not be justified in case of optional withdrawal rights
as proposed in this article for distance selling transactions. If a consumer has
deliberately chosen to have a withdrawal right, there is no reason to alert the
consumer as to the existence of that right or his or her ability to exercise it once
it has become exercisable. On balance then, the better arguments support
retaining the status quo. A duty to confirm an agreement that has already been
concluded should not be required.
Another instrument to enhance the effectiveness of withdrawal rights might
be special instructions on the existence of such rights. An empirical study in
the UK has revealed the surprising fact that 34 percent of consumers believe
they have more rights when buying at a local shop as compared to doorstep
purchases43. Apparently, the consumers are not well informed with respect to
their withdrawal rights. The current European rules under the various direc-
tives on the consumers’ instructions with respect to the existence of with-
drawal rights differ significantly44. Standardization in this area would be help-
ful. There should be one standardized set of (electronic) instructions on the
existence of a withdrawal right for all types of withdrawal rights.
41 See D. Kennedy, ‘Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique’ (1981) 33
Stanf L Rev 387.
42 For this proposal see Eidenmüller, n 40 above, 222.
43 Office of Fair Trading, Doorstep selling: A report on the market study, 2004, http://
www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/consumer_protection/oft716.pdf, 6.
44 Contrast, for example, art 4 of the doorstep selling directive with art 4 et seq of the
timesharing directive.
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Finally, lowering the costs of exercising the right to withdraw might also be a
sensible means to enhance effectiveness of these rights. Again, the current
European legal status quo under the various directives with respect to how a
withdrawal right must be exercised is characterised by some diversity45. It
would enhance legal transparency and increase the effectiveness of withdrawal
rights if, as a general rule, the law would provide that a withdrawal right may
be exercised by any declaration in any form that clearly expresses the will to
withdraw (this would be in line with Article 6 of the distance selling direc-
tive)46.
A more difficult question, however, is whether relieving consumers from costs
of unwinding the contract and potential damages for loss in value of the goods
purchased would be an appropriate measure. Again, the existing European
directives provide somewhat diverse rules47. The ECJ has recently clarified
some of the issues in the Messner/Krüger case48. It is of course true that the
lower the costs levied upon the consumer, the higher the rate of consumer
withdrawal will be49. On the other hand, opportunistic consumer behaviour
should be discouraged50. Retailers report a significant number of cases in
which goods such as wedding dresses and evening wear are ‘borrowed’ for a
singular event51. Hence, allowing businesses to shift the costs of sending back
the goods purchased appears to be a sensible rule, as is a potential responsi-
45 Contrast, for example, art 7 of the doorstep selling directive with art 7 of the timesharing
directive.
46 See also Loos, n 14 above, 17 et seq.
47 Contrast, for example, art 6(2) of the distance selling directive with art 8(2) of the time-
sharing directive and art 17 of the draft consumer rights directive.
48 ECJ, Case 489/07 (Messner v Krüger), Judgment of 3 September 2009 (holding that
art 6(1) and art 6(2) of the distance selling directive must be interpreted as precluding a
provision of national law which provides in general that, in the case of withdrawal by a
consumer within the withdrawal period, a seller may claim compensation for the value of
the use of the consumer goods acquired under a distance contract; however, those pro-
visions do not prevent the consumer from being required to pay compensation for the
use of the goods in the case where he has made use of those goods in a manner incom-
patible with the principles of civil law, such as those of good faith or unjust enrichment,
on condition that the purpose of the distance selling directive and, in particular, the
efficiency and effectiveness of the right of withdrawal are not adversely affected, this
being a matter for the national court to determine). See also ECJ, Case 511/08 (Heinrich
Heine), Judgment of 15 April 2010 (holding that art 6(1) and art 6(2) must be interpreted
as precluding national legislation which allows the supplier under a distance contract to
charge the costs of delivering the goods to the consumer where the latter exercises his
right of withdrawal).
49 However, empirical studies show that the costs of sending back the goods purchased
influence the purchase decision only marginally in the first place, see Borges and Irlen-
busch, n 9 above, 98.
50 See also Ben-Shahar and Posner, n 7 above, 16.
51 See the results of the DIHK study, n 39 above, answers to questions 9a and 11a.
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bility of consumers for damages to the goods that are not necessarily associ-
ated with unpacking and inspecting the goods upon their receipt. For example,
a consumer’s use of the goods purchased over a specified period of time, and
within the withdrawal period, should give rise to a responsibility of the con-
sumer to pay the vendor for the loss of value of the goods sold. Such loss of
value is equivalent to the use value obtained by the consumer, as the value of a
particular good consists of the discounted sum of all use opportunities pro-
vided by the good52.
As a further intermediate conclusion it can be stated that the effectiveness of
withdrawal rights should be enhanced by standardizing the instructions with
respect to the existence of such rights and by lowering the costs of a with-
drawal. However, changing the structure of a withdrawal right by stipulating a
duty to validate or confirm an already completed agreement would not be
justified.
V Beyond the consumer
Thus far, the discussion in this article has been based upon the premise that
withdrawal rights are a consumer protection tool. However, Directive 2002/
83/EC concerning life insurance already stipulates a cancellation right for all
policy holders under a life insurance contract, be they consumers or not.
Similarly, some countries grant withdrawal rights to businesses with respect
to certain transactions. Germany, for example, provides in Section 8 of the
Versicherungsvertragsgesetz [Insurance Contract Act] since 1 January 2008
that all types of insurance contracts which last for longer than one month
are subject to a fourteen day withdrawal right. This right is also granted to
businesses entering into such contracts.
The concept of full harmonization that is central to the draft consumer rights
directive53 would not, if actually adopted, prevent member states from extend-
ing withdrawal rights beyond the consumer. That concept would only be
applicable in the domain of consumer rights, i.e. it would prevent member
states from granting consumers more or less rights than set forth in the direc-
tive. It would not, however, prevent member states from also extending with-
drawal rights to businesses that are not ‘right holders’ in the ambit of the
consumer rights directive.
However, such extension would not be justified. Considering exogenous and
endogenous preference distortions first, commercially active parties are much
less irrational and far more informed than the typical consumer. They have
52 Similarly Loos, n 14 above, 21 et seq.
53 See art 4 of the draft directive.
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certain experience with aggressive sales practices, and time pressure, etc.
Hence, businesses’ typical situation differs from that of regular consumers
even though there might be exogenous and/or endogenous distorted prefer-
ences in individual cases. Since a sound policy basis for withdrawal rights must
look to the typical effects in certain case settings, granting businesses a with-
drawal right would not be justified54.
However, the situation with respect to distance selling transactions might be
considered differently. It is true that businesses can also be expected to suffer
less from information asymmetries than do consumers. On the other hand, it
has been noted in a previous section that with respect to distance selling trans-
actions withdrawal rights should only be optional. Consequently, extending
that optional regime to businesses would be a justifiable policy decision, also
because it would contribute to a standardization of contract practice. Apart
from this specific case, however, withdrawal rights are a consumer protection
tool, and should remain so.
VI Summary and conclusion
Withdrawal rights have become an important element of the European con-
sumer law acquis and its further development. They figure prominently in a
number of European consumer law directives, in the draft directive on con-
sumer rights, in the ACQP, and in the DCFR. However, this prominence of
withdrawal rights as a consumer protection tool is not matched by a profound
analysis of their normative foundations. This article has attempted to address
the pressing issue of the following fundamental question: when do withdrawal
rights make sense and why? The main conclusions of the article may be sum-
marised as follows:
1. Withdrawal rights involve a departure from the fundamental principle of
pacta sunt servanda. Hence, offering a coherent and compelling justifica-
tion for withdrawal rights is an important academic and policy task.
2. Withdrawal rights should be granted only if their benefits clearly exceed
their cost.
3. In the distance selling context, information asymmetries might lead to
market failure. In this context, vendors should be obliged to provide con-
sumers an option to contract with a withdrawal right.
4. Exogenously distorted preferences justify providing a mandatory with-
54 See also C.-W. Canaris, ‘Wandlungen des Schuldvertragsrechts – Tendenzen zu seiner
Materialisierung’ (2000) 200 Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 273, 349 et seq, 359 et seq;
Ben-Shahar and Posner, n 7 above, 20 et seq.
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drawal right in the doorstep selling context – but not for all contracts
concluded off-premises.
5. Endogenously distorted preferences justify providing a mandatory with-
drawal right with respect to timesharing agreements, credit contracts, and
life insurance contracts.
6. The effectiveness of withdrawal rights could be enhanced by standardizing
the instructions on the existence of withdrawal rights and by lowering the
costs of withdrawals.
7. Withdrawal rights are a consumer protection tool, and should remain so.
If these results are compared to the current European legal status quo, to the
academic principles reflected in the ACQP and the DCFR, and to European
policy plans, the two following main conclusions emerge: (1) As opposed to
the current European legal status quo, withdrawal rights in the distance selling
context should only be optional; (2) Plans to extend withdrawal rights to all
off-premises contracts should be dropped.
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